2014年ACCA考試《P4高級財務(wù)管理》知識輔導1

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        THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS

　　There is much talk in the media about the ˉdebt crisisˇ and as professional accountants we ought to have an understanding of how it has come about, and what is being done and what may be done to try and resolve it. Furthermore although only an unfortunate few of us have noticed any significant ill-effect as a result of the crisis we ought to consider the potential impact that it could have on both businesses and individuals.

　　With the introduction of the Euro it became possible for some Eurozone countries to borrow at much cheaper rates than previously. This is because although the debt was still national debt, the assumption was made that being within the Euro meant that the risk of these countries had declined as a result of the economic rules they were now bound into. The principle rules required Eurozone members to ensure that government debt did not exceed 60% of GDP and that any budget deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP. Effectively the gloss of the good credit rating of countries such as Germany rubbed off on countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain  the ˉPIIGSˇ as they are sometimes known.

　　Unfortunately, while Germany continued its tradition of investing in research and development and other productive purposes, the PIIGS used too much of the available credit to consume more, build generous social systems and fund a construction boom.

　　As a result of the growth in consumption, many of the countries now in trouble built up large balance of payment deficits that are clearly not sustainable. However, this excess consumption was tacitly encouraged by others as it helped demand and growth in their own economy.

　　The financial crisis which started in 2007 caused problems with the liquidity of banks and, as a result, lending and economic growth faltered. However, many of the loans made to both governments and private organisations had assumed certain levels of growth and when these failed to materialise problems arose with repaying and servicing the debts.

　　The construction boom led to real estate bubbles especially in Ireland and Spain. A large quantity of bank loans, made against the security of property, the demand for which evaporated due to the economic slowdown, has gone bad. This has caused the

　　need for large write offs. In Ireland the government had to step in and guarantee these loans in order to prevent the six main Irish banks from failing.

　　The failure of some countries to stay within the economic rules set for the Eurozone and the failure of the Eurozone as a whole to police these rules, which effectively let countries get away with circumventing and/or ignoring the rules, has meant that countries are now tied to a currency over which they have little control and which, due in part to their own failure to abide by the criteria set, is no longer suitable for their needs. As a member of the Euro they do not have the power to d*ue their currency or the monetary policy flexibility to take other action to try and resolve the situation they find themselves in. For instance, in Greece tourism  which accounts for 18% of Greek GDP and employs about one in five Greek workers  has been significantly reduced as a result of the strength of the Euro.

　　As the crisis has developed, the loss of confidence in the countries affected has led to rises in the bond yields required on their government debt. Given the amount of debt their governments have, bond yields can quickly achieve a level at which the government can no longer afford to service their debt. This loss of confidence has been fuelled by downgrades from the credit rating agencies, media speculation and speculators betting against the Euro and/or certain countries. Indeed, the bail out that Portugal required was thought to be driven to a certain extent by the actions of speculators.

　　A lack of firm and decisive action by the Eurozone countries and institutions has also added to the crisis. The Euro was established with no mechanism for a country to leave and bail outs of individual countries were not allowed for or expected. This is because all Eurozone members were supposed to adhere to the rules that would have prevented the current situation arising in the first place. Hence, there has been much dithering before action has been taken.

　　In most of the nations with problems, the key issue is thought to be one of liquidity as opposed to insolvency. That is, while they can fundamentally service the debt they hold given normal economic conditions, they may have problems finding the cash they need in the short term. As long as countries are given assistance and provided with loans to keep them liquid when required, default in the short term can be avoided. Greece is however potentially insolvent and more drastic action is likely to be needed. Indeed some Greek creditors have already had to agree to a significant write down of the value of their debt  this is known as taking a haircut.

　　No country has been allowed to default for fear that this could cause a domino effect and cause defaults of other banks and nations  known as contagion. However, this has led to piecemeal action  ˉbail outsˇ  as and where the crisis has required it and many commentators fear it is simply putting off the day when the problem must be faced properly  ˉkicking the can down the roadˇ is an * that has been much used. The existence of credit default swaps (CDS) which provide guarantees on sovereign bonds has exacerbated the fears as it is has made it less clear as to where exactly the pain will fall if a country defaults. There is perhaps too much fear of default. For instance, Russia defaulted in 1998 but can once again borrow in the international money markets at reasonable rates.

　　The measures taken which have prevented default to date include:

　　Emergency measures taken by the EU include:

　　Increasing the minimum level of bank capitalisation to aid their stability and ability to withstand further shocks.

　　European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This was created in May 2010 to raise the funds needed to provide loans to Eurozone countries in financial trouble, to buy sovereign debt and to recapitalise banks. The EFSF is jointly and severally guaranteed by the Eurozone countries.

　　European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). This was created in January 2011 and involves the European Commission raising funds using the EU budget as collateral. The EFSM has lent funds in conjunction with both the EFSF and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).